Understanding Pramāṇa in the Indian Knowledge System: Sources, Validation, and Contemporary Relevance
Authors-Soumi Hazra, Dr. Newtan Biswas
Keyword-keywords: Pramāṇa, Indian epistemology, pramā, apramā, perception, inference, testimony, Indian Knowledge System, knowledge validation
Abstract. The Indian knowledge tradition has developed a sophisticated epistemological framework for understanding the nature, sources, and validity of knowledge. At the centre of this framework is the concept of pramāṇa, generally understood as a valid means or source of knowledge. Indian philosophers were concerned not merely with what is known, but also with how knowledge is acquired, what makes cognition valid, and how valid knowledge can be distinguished from error. The theory of pramāṇa therefore constitutes an important foundation of Indian epistemology. Different philosophical schools developed distinct classifications of pramāṇas, reflecting their divergent philosophical commitments. The Sāṃkhya and Yoga traditions generally recognize three—pratyakṣa (perception), anumāna (inference), and śabda (verbal testimony); Nyāya recognizes four by additionally accepting upamāna (comparison); while Advaita Vedānta recognizes six, adding arthāpatti (postulation) and anupalabdhi (non-apprehension). Buddhist epistemologists such as Dignāga and Dharmakīrti accept perception and inference as the two reliable means of knowledge, whereas Cārvāka gives primacy exclusively to perception. This paper examines the concept and forms of pramāṇa, its role in the validation of knowledge, its interpretation across philosophical traditions, and its possible application to contemporary knowledge practices. The paper argues that the epistemological concern underlying pramāṇa remains highly relevant to contemporary knowledge systems, particularly in developing critical, evidence-based, and responsible approaches to information.
Doi-[https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22327123]